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Abstract—Deep Learning (DL) techniques allow one to train a model from a dataset, and the model can be adopted to solve tasks. DL
has attracted much interest given its fancy performance and potential market value, while security issues are amongst the most
colossal concerns. Being a core engine of DL, models may be prone to the membership inference attack, where an attacker
determines whether a given sample is from the dataset the model trained on. Efforts have been made to hinder the attack but
unfortunately, they may be subject to a major overhead or impaired usability. In this paper, we propose and implement DAMIA,
leveraging Domain Adaptation (DA) as a defense to counter membership inference attacks. Our observation is that during the training
process, DA obfuscates the dataset to be protected using another related dataset, and derives a model that underlyingly extracts the
features from both the original dataset and the introduced dataset. Seeing that the model is obfuscated, membership inference fails,
while the extracted common features provide supports for usability. Extensive experiments have been conducted, which validates our
intuition. The model counters the membership inference attacks and has a negligible footprint to the usability. Our experiment also
excludes a few factors that may hinder the performance of DAMIA, providing a potential guideline that instructs the vendors and
researchers to benefit from our solution in a timely manner.
Index Terms—Privacy-Preserving Machine Learning, Membership Inference Attack, Domain Adaptation, Deep Learning
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1 INTRODUCTION
Deep Learning (DL) is a subfield of machine learning, and
it is inspired by the working of human brains in data
processing. Specifically, DL forms a mathematical model
based on sample data, i.e., the training data, and pro-
gressively extracts higher level features from sample data,
based on which the model can make decisions without
human’s involvement. Due to the fancy performance, DL
has been widely adopted in a large range of domains,
including image classification [1, 2] object recognition [3],
person re-identification [4], and disease prediction [5]. As an
illustration of such a trend, the market of DL is booming and
estimated to hit USD 7.2 billion during 2020-2024, according
to the statistics from Technavio [6].
While DL is penetrating the academia and industry, its
explosive growth and huge potential also attract cybercrim-
inals, bringing the rampant security issues against the DL
community. In general, the model may be publicly accessi-
ble, while training data, as well as the properties of training
data, are considered confidential. Therefore, extracting the
training samples and the related information via the model
is a violation of the security setting in DL, which has been
widely discussed in previous efforts [7, 8, 9, 10]. Among
the attacks, the membership inference attack, which was
proposed by Shokri et al. [8], has attracted a lot of recent
attention [11, 12, 13]. In this attack, the attacker may craft a
malicious inference model based on predictions of a victim
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model. Due to the fact that a model has a better performance
when a sample is from the original training dataset, the
attacker may use the inference model to determine if a
sample is from the training dataset of a victim model.
A model without any capability against membership
inference attacks may lead to grave consequences, in that the
DL models are adopted on large-dimension (and potentially
sensitive) user dataset. For example, Pyrgelis et al. [11]
present that membership inference is feasible on aggregate
location data in real-world settings, where the attacker
can reveals a user’s locations and actively traces the user.
Chen et al. [12] deploy membership attacks against medical
records, and the involved patients may be plagued by
disease discrimination issues. Further, training data leakage
may spawn pecuniary losses or even legal disputes for
enterprises. According to GDPR (General Data Protection
Regulation) [14], vendors now are forced to protect user
privacy, and violations of GDPR may be imposed a penalty
up to 20 million euros, or 4% of the offender’s global
turnover of the preceding fiscal year.
Efforts have been made to counter membership inference
attacks, while they are plagued by either heavily over-
head or hindered usability. These efforts can be categorized
into three groups: (i) regularization-based defenses; (ii)
adversarial-attack based defenses; (iii) differential-privacy-
based defenses. Regularization-based defenses adapt regu-
larization techniques to design countermeasures; however,
it may lead to heavy overhead when complex regular-
ization techniques are adapted. For example, Salem et al.
[15] demonstrate that ensemble learning (a regularization
technique) can be adapted to counter against member-
ship inference attack, but multiple types of ML models
are required, which brings significant training and storage
costs. Adversarial-attack-based defenses utilize adversarial
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2examples [16] to obfuscate the membership inference attack
model, but the defenses require extra efforts in finding
proper perturbations. For instance, Jia et al. [17] propose
a defense called MemGuard to modify the outputs of the
victim model into adversarial examples, but a model mim-
icking the attacker is required to assist finding perturba-
tions, which is time consuming. Differential-Privacy-based
defenses adopt differential privacy to add noises during
model training to thwart the attacks. However, the usability
of the model is also impaired as discussed in [11, 18].
It can be observed from these previous works [11,
18] that to counter against membership inference attack,
one conventional wisdom is to introduce perturbations
or noises. However, those newly introduced perturba-
tions/noises also downgrade the usability of the model.
Therefore, exploring a solution that may bridge the gap
between usability and security is a vital challenge. In this
paper, we leverage Domain Adaptation (DA) to build a
defense in defending membership inference attacks. DA
allows knowledge to be transferred from a source domain
to a different (but related) target domain. For example,
DA may utilize images dataset of cats and dogs collected
from Instagram (i.e., source domain) to solve new tasks
such as categorizing pictures of cats and dogs clipped from
animation movies (i.e., target domain). To this end, DA
may train a shared representation (in our context, a shared
representation is learned by a model) from the dataset in the
source domain and the dataset in the target domain, and
the shared representation shares the underlying common
features of the two datasets. Our observation is that the two
datasets are mixed and obfuscated when DA is adopted.
Intuitively, if the sensitive dataset is in the target domain, we
can find a different but related dataset in a source domain,
and leverage DA to obfuscate the sensitive dataset. In such
a way, membership inference attacks fail while the newly
generated shared representation may also have a good
performance in solving tasks requiring a sensitive dataset
since the shared representation contains the features from
the sensitive dataset. Also, the overhead of our defense is
slight to none, in that there are no extra phases/algorithms
that are involved in the model once it has released.
To validate our intuition, we design and implement
DAMIA 1, leveraging Domain Adaptation (DA) as a de-
fense to counter membership inference attacks. We conduct
extensive experiments to benchmark a balance where mem-
bership inference attacks are defended while the usability of
the model is not affected. In terms of that, multiple metrics
have been evaluated, including the effectiveness, accuracy
and various other metrics. Of all the metrics, we also design
a few novel metrics, which greatly outlines the capability
of DAMIA. According to our experiments, while settings
may vary, our defense always has a good performance in
defending the membership inference attacks. Specifically,
the success rate of an attacker is close to 50%, which
is roughly equivalent to a random guess. However, with
higher similarity between the source dataset and the sensi-
tive dataset, the accuracy of the model (i.e., the usability)
1. Damia is a Greek goddess who brings the fertility of the soil, and
we hope our DAMIA also brings the “fertility” of DL community by
mitigating the membership inference attacks.
shall be significantly boosted. Given that, we argue that our
defense will not hinder the usability of the original model
and has negligible fingerprints.
Contributions Our paper makes the following contribu-
tions:
• We propose that DA is feasible to be leveraged
against membership inference attacks. To our best
known, we are the first to adopt DA in the domain
of defending membership inference attacks.
• We design and implement DAMIA (i.e., Domain
Adaptation against Membership Inference Attacks).
Our experiment shows that DAMIA is capable of de-
fending against membership inference attacks with
high performance up to 50%, which is roughly equiv-
alent to a random guess.
• We design a few metrics that can measure a model’s
capability of defending against membership attacks.
We believe some of the metrics can better reflect the
capability when compared with the legacy ones.
• We further investigate a few factors that may affect
our results in terms of accuracy. Our attempts may
also bring benefits and values for vendors and re-
searchers that have interests in adopting our defense,
in that we excluded a few factors that may impair the
usability of our defense.
Roadmap: The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
In Section 2, we provide background on membership infer-
ence attacks and domain adaptation. In Section 3 we define
the threat model and represent the insight and the design of
DAMIA. In Section 4 we evaluate the effectiveness and var-
ious other metrics of DAMIA, and we also explore factors
of the source domain that affect the accuracy of DAMIA. In
Section 5, we present related works and conclude the paper
in Section 6.
2 BACKGROUND
This section introduces background knowledge including
the membership inference attack and domain adaptation.
2.1 Membership Inference Attacks
Membership inference attack is a type of attack against
deep learning models, which can be deployed to determine
whether a sample is from the training set of a victim model.
The basic idea of the attack is that the information exposed
by the model contains the abundant information of the
training data, based on which an attacker may perform
membership inferences. Theoretically, all characteristics of
the victim model such as activation values, affine outputs,
gradients or even the model’s transparency report, can
be utilized by attackers to deploy the attack [15, 19, 20].
Given that most of the above characteristics are not publicly
accessible, attackers may solely rely on the outputs of the
model to deploy the attack in practice.
Mathematically, a victim DL model M trained on a
dataset D, which handles a classification task, categorizing
all its inputs into n categories. Any sample si fed into M
will result in an output oi = (p1, p2, ..., pj , ..., pn), where pj
is the confidence score, indicating the probability of being
a sample of the category j. To deploy the membership
3inference attack, an attacker may train a binary classifier
Madv to determine whether a sample si is from the training
data D.
member or not = Madv(oi)
A simple but efficient way to initiate a membership infer-
ence attack is to build a linear binary classifier M lin.adv using a
confidence threshold Pthresh as a decision boundary, which
is selected based on extensive experiments. In particular,
one may enumerate all possible confidence scores to find
the Pthresh, which can achieve the maximum accuracy of
membership inference [21]. With Pthresh, if the confidence
score of a sample for a specific category k (1 ≤ k ≤ n) is
higher than Pthresh, M lin.adv will determine the sample as a
member of the training set. Formally, the procedure can be
defined as follows:
M lin.adv =
{
1 pk ≥ Pthresd
0 pk < Pthresd
Noted that 1 stands for member and 0 stands for non-
member.
Compared with other attacks such as model inversion
[7, 22], the impact of membership inference attack is rela-
tively minor. However, membership inference is easier to
deploy and requires less information on the victim model
compared with other attacks. Therefore, when an attacker
attempts to compromise a model so as to derive the sensitive
information, the membership inference attack is served as a
“metric”, probing whether the model is potentially vulner-
able. If the membership inference attack is possible, other
attacks with higher severity can then be launched.
2.2 Domain Adaptation
Domain Adaptation (DA) is a branch of transfer learn-
ing [23], aiming to address the issue of insufficient la-
beled training data. It utilizes the knowledge of one or
more relevant source domains to conduct new tasks in
a target domain. Mathematically, we denote a domain as
D = {X , P (X)}, in which X represents the feature space
and P (X) represents the margin probability distribution,
X = {x1, x2, ..., xn} ∈ X . A task on a specific domain is
denoted as T = {Y, f(x)}, where Y is the label space and
f(x) is the target prediction function. Therefore, a source
domain can be represented as Ds = {Xs, P (X)s}, while
a target domain can be represented as Dt = {Xt, P (X)t}.
Correspondingly, Ts = {Ys, f(x)s} and Tt = {Yt, f(x)t}
are two tasks. The goal of DA is to leverage the latent
knowledge from Ds and Ts to improve the performance
of f(x)t in Tt, where Ds 6= Dt. Please noted that in do-
main adaptation, Ts = Tt. Basically, the approach achieves
the knowledge transferring by driving the model to learn
the shared representation of the source domain and tar-
get domain. Various approaches of DA have been intro-
duced, which can be grouped into three categories [24],
including discrepancy-based approaches, adversarial-based
approaches and reconstruction-based approaches. We now
elaborate on each category in detail:
Discrepancy-based Approaches. Discrepancy-based ap-
proaches assume that a shared representation of the source
and target domain can be obtained by fine-tuning the DL
model with labeled or unlabeled data. The approaches can
be implemented in multiple ways, and as one of the popular
criterion, statistic criterion using some mechanisms to align
the statistical distribution shift between the source and tar-
get domains. For example, Tzeng et al. [25] proposed deep
domain confusion (DDC) by introducing Maximum Mean
Discrepancy (MMD) to the loss function. Specifically, they
add MMD into the loss function and regrade it as a metric
to quantitatively measure the distance between domains.
That is, a smaller enough MMD will reflect that the shared
representation has been obtained by the model, and the goal
during the training process is to minimize MMD. We give
the definition of MMD as follows, please noted that φ(·)
is a kernel function that maps inputs to a space of higher
dimensionality:
DMMD (XS , XT ) =
∥∥∥∥∥∥ 1|XS |
∑
xs∈XS
φ (xs)− 1|XT |
∑
xt∈XT
φ (xt)
∥∥∥∥∥∥
Correspondingly, the loss function can be represented as
follows:
Loss = LossC (XL, y) + λD
2
MMD (XS , XT )
Adversarial-based Approaches. Adversarial-based ap-
proaches construct the shared representation in an adver-
sarial way [26, 27, 28]. Specifically, Generative Adversarial
Learning (GAN) pit two networks against each other –
known as the discriminator and the generator. Originally,
the generator is trained to produce samples that may
confuse the discriminator, so that the discriminator may
fail to distinguish a generated sample and a sample from
the genuine dataset. In Adversarial-based approaches, the
principle is adopted to ensure that the discriminator cannot
determine whether a sample is generated from a generator,
or originally from the source/target domain, indicating the
generator is capable of generating the shared representation.
Reconstruction-based Approaches. Reconstruction-
based approaches construct the shared representation
through a reconstruction process. That is, providing that a
representation can be reconstructed into samples in both the
source and target domains, the representation is considered
as the one shared of the source and target domains. Similar
to the generator in adversarial-based approaches, a model
that can produce such a representation is the one of interest.
For example, Ghifary et al. [29] uses an autoencoder [30]
for domain adaptation, in which the encoder is for shared
representation learning and a decoder is used to reconstruct
the representation.
3 DAMIA: DOMAIN ADAPTATION AGAINST MEM-
BERSHIP INFERENCE ATTACKS
In this section, we first define our threat model. Afterwards,
we shed light on the idea of DAMIA, in which we leverage
DA as a defense against membership inference attacks.
3.1 Threat Model
DAMIA works under the scenario of MLaaS (Machine-
Learning-as-a-Service) where a DL model is served to the
public, and only the prediction APIs are exposed to users
4for feeding inputs. In such a scenario, users can collect the
outputs (i.e., the prediction vectors) when the model finishes
the processing, and the goal of DAMIA, as the name implies,
is to defeat the membership inferring attacks.
Specifically, we make the following assumptions:
1) We assume that the attacker has only black-box
access to the victim model. That is, the only way
an attacker can interact with the victim model is to
invoke the prediction APIs and collect outputs from
the victim model.
2) We assume that the attacker knows the distribution
that the training data of the victim model drawn
from, meaning that an attacker may obtain all the
possible values in the training data that the model
trained on. However, given specific data, the at-
tacker does not know whether they are in the train-
ing dataset. Note that this assumption is also made
in most of the membership inference threat model
[8, 15, 21].
3) We assume that the attacker is not aware of the
implementation of the target model, including the
architecture, the training algorithm and the hyper-
parameters such learning rates. This is reasonable
because other than the model, the underlying archi-
tecture as well as the hyperparameters are usually
not public in practical.
4) We further assume that the attacker has the ability
to access the target domain as well as the source
domain.
3.2 Insight and Design
Membership inference attacks are feasible due to the fact
that the model may achieve a better performance when the
input is from the training dataset, which is considered as
sensitive. Therefore, a straightforward solution is to obfus-
cate the sensitive dataset, so that membership inference at-
tacks against the sensitive dataset are not possible. However,
a model is trained on an obfuscated dataset, may not achieve
the same goal in a specific task as the sensitive dataset does.
For example, categorizing pictures of cats and dogs clipped
from animation movies may not be performed if the pictures
of cats and dogs aforementioned were blurred during the
training process. Therefore, exploring a solution that may
bridge the gap between the original sensitive dataset and
an obfuscated dataset in terms of balancing usability and
security is a vital challenge.
In this paper, we propose DAMIA, i.e., Domain Adap-
tation against Membership Inference Attacks. As the name
implies, DAMIA adopts the Domain Adaptation as the core
engine of our solution. Our intuition is that Domain Adap-
tation can generate a shared representation (i.e., a model) of
a source domain and a target domain, where the sensitive
dataset belongs to the target domain, and the other dataset
from source domain is provided to obfuscate the sensitive
data set. As a consequence, the shared representation should
have good support in defending membership inference at-
tack against a sensitive dataset, since the sensitive dataset
is obfuscated during the training process. Meanwhile, the
extracted shared representation can also be used to solve
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Fig. 1. Workflow of DAMIA.
tasks that require the use of the sensitive dataset, which has
been widely discussed in [26, 27, 28].
Figure 1 illustrates the workflow, which includes the
flowing steps:
1) Domain adaptation requires one dataset from the
source domain and one dataset from the target
domain. Initially, only the sensitive data is given,
and the domain that the sensitive dataset belongs to
is now referred to the target domain. For example,
the sensitive dataset in our context can be an image-
set which contains pictures of cat and dogs clipped
from animation movies.
2) We find a dataset other than the sensitive dataset
in a different but related domain. For example, we
can find an image-set collected from Instagram,
containing pictures of cats and dogs from the real
world.
3) we adopt domain adaptation training to train a
model. In our exemplary example, domain adapta-
tion will train a shared representation based on the
two image-sets containing images of cats and dogs,
i.e., image-set collected from animation movies and
image-set collected from Instagram. Please note that
the labels of the first image-set are removed before
the training to cohere with the training process of
domain adaptation. Consequently, the shared rep-
resentation will not raise a violation of confidential
of the image-set collected from animation movies,
which is considered sensitive.
54 EVALUATION
We now explore analytically the performance of DAMIA. As
stated above, the intuition is that DA can obfuscate sensitive
datasets with a different but related dataset, generating a
shared representation that shares underlying common fea-
tures with the sensitive dataset, thwarting the membership
inference attack. Obviously, there is a trade-off between
security and usability, due to the fact that an obfuscated
dataset may not achieve the same performance as the orig-
inal dataset does. Given that, we attempt to answer the
following three questions.
Q1: Is DAMIA effective in countering membership infer-
ence attack?
Q2: Do all types of domain adaptation techniques have the
same effects in countering membership inference attack?
Q3: What are the factors that may impact the performance
of DAMIA? And how could the DAMIA achieve the best
performance by manipulating those factors?
The rest of this section is organized as follows: we
first present our experiment setup. Afterwards, we use
three standalone subsections to evaluate different aspects
of DAMIA, answering the aforementioned three questions
correspondingly.
4.1 Experiment Setup
All our experiments are conducted on a Ubuntu 16.04 server
with a Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2640 CPU, 4 GTX 1080
GPUs and memory with a size of 130 GB. We use PyTorch
2 to build our deep learning models for evaluation. The
datasets involved in our experiments including (i) MINST
(ii) SVHN and (iii) Office-31.
Specifically, MINST is an image dataset containing hand-
written digits with an image size of 28 × 28. All the digits
are in the range of 0 to 9 and all the images are gray-
scale. MNIST contains 70,000 images totally, in which 60,000
images are used as the training set and the rest are served as
the non-training set (i.e. test set). Similar to MNIST, SVHN is
also an image dataset of digits of 0 to 9 with an image size of
32×32. The training dataset contains 73257 images, the non-
training dataset is with a size of 26032, and the extra training
dataset is with a size of 531131. Some representative samples
from the two datasets are shown in Figure 2. Office-31 3
is a dataset about objects commonly appeared in an office
setting. The dataset totally consists of 4110 images from
three domains — Amazon, DSLR and Webcam, each domain
contains 31 categories respectively, which is designed for
domain adaptation. Images in domain Amazon are collected
directly from amazon.com, which are prepossessed so that
there is only a target object in a blank white background.
Images in domains Webcam and DSLR are shot by web
cameras and DSLR (digital single-lens reflex) cameras in a
real-world office. The two domains are similar to each other,
and the most difference is the object’s pose and the lighting
condition. The details of Office-31 is are shown in Table 1
and the difference among the three domains are shown in
2. https://github.com/pytorch/pytorch
3. https://people.eecs.berkeley.edu/ jhoffman/domainadapt/
Fig. 2. Representative samples from MNIST (left) and SVHN (right).
TABLE 1
Details of Office-31
Domains Total Amount Training Set (80%) Non-training Set (20%)
Amazon 2817 2253 564
DSLR 498 398 100
Webcam 795 636 159
Figure 3. Please note that all the datasets are utilized as
either source domain or target domain, and are split into
training sets and non-training sets.
4.2 Effectiveness
To Q1, we define the effectiveness of DAMIA as the capabili-
ties in defending membership inference attacks. We use two
models with the same architecture, i.e., AlexNet [31], and
adopt a few metrics to demonstrate it. The two models are:
(i) a model trained on dataset Webcam from Office-31;
(ii) a model trained by DAMIA, in which the target domain
and source domain may vary according to the specific
context. During the training process, the discrepancy-based
domain adaptation technique, Deep Domain Confusion [25]
(DDC), is adopted for training DAMIA. The membership
inference attack used in our experiment is a threshold-based
membership inference attack introduced in [21, 32]. We will
not provide the details of the attack due to the page limit.
The origination of this part is as follows: initially, we
evaluate the effectiveness of DAMIA by using two legacy
metrics, which will reflect the advantage of an attacker.
In particular, the metrics introduced in our paper are also
widely adopted in other efforts [21, 33], and these metrics
are generalization error, prediction distributions. Further,
we also introduce two novel metrics, which may also reflect
the capabilities of a model in defending the membership
inference attacks. These metrics are the intermediate rep-
resentation and the advantage of membership inference
Fig. 3. Images of bikes from 3 different domains in Office-31.
6attacks. Please refer to the corresponding paragraph for the
definition of each metric.
4.2.1 Legacy Metrics of Effectiveness
Generalization Error: Generalization error is a metric to
evaluate the performance of a model when a non-training
dataset is involved. If the generalization error is low, a
model can achieve a good performance, which may be close
to the performance when the model tests on the training
dataset. Therefore, an attacker may want to maximize the
generalization error. For each dataset, we trained two mod-
els including one with DAMIA enabled, while the other one
is idle. For the one with DAMIA enabled, we first assume
the attacker may want to deploy attacks against Webcam,
so that a dataset from Amazon is used in our experiment to
obfuscate Webcam. We then assume the attacker may want
to attack against Amazon, and similarly, the Webcam is then
used to obfuscate Amazon. Figure 4 and Figure 5 show the
generalization error for Webcam and Amazon respectively.
It can be observed that whatever the dataset is, a model
with DAMIA enabled has a lower generalization error when
compared with the one without DAMIA, indicating the
DAMIA is effective in defending against the membership
inferences attacks.
Prediction Distributions: Prediction distribution is re-
ferred to as the distribution of the probability of being a
sample from each category [33] . Basically, if the prediction
distribution of a training dataset and that of the non-training
dataset are close to each other, one cannot tell difference.
In other words, the membership inference attack may fail
in this case. The experiment procedures and dataset used
are similar to the first one, and we will not go to details.
Recall that each dataset in Office-31 contains different
categories of images. We select and plot the prediction dis-
tributions of a few categories, including desk chair (category
label “7”), mobile phone (category label “15”), ring binder
(category label “25”) and speaker (category label “28”). As
demonstrated in Figure 6, the figures on the left side show
categories of the model with DAMIA enabled, while the
ones on the left side that does not. It can be observed that
the prediction distributions of the model with DAMIA are
more approximate when compared with the one without.
This will bring more challenges for an attacker whose goal
is to deploy the membership inference attacks.
4.2.2 New Metrics of Effectiveness
Intermediate Representation: Intermediate representation
reveals the way of a DL model processes its training data.
Basically, a DL model will go through a feature extraction
process and a classification process throughout the entire
training, and the outputs of the feature extraction process
are referred to as intermediate representations, which may
affect the accuracy of the classification process. Given that
an attacker leverage the outputs of the classification pro-
cess to derive membership inference attack, intuitively, the
intermediate representation may also have an association
with the success rate of deploying the membership inference
attack. We conduct a similar experiment to confirm our
intuition, and the intermediate representations are from the
fifth convolution layer (the training process goes through
multiple training layers [34]), with their dimensionalities
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Fig. 4. Empirical Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of the general-
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Fig. 5. Empirical Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of the general-
ization error of models across different categories in Amazon. Webcam
is used for obfuscation.
(i.e., the number of attributes that data have) reduced to two
[35]. Intermediate representations are shown in Figure 7.
Samples from the same category are with the same color
and the same category label, and we carefully assign all the
colors to avoid the conflicts. It can be observed that, with
DAMIA enabled, data of each category forms a more com-
pact cluster, and the intermediate representations of the non-
training samples are much close to the training samples.
The result indicates that the way that the model trained by
DAMIA does process the training data and non-training in
a similar way, creating barriers for distinguishing training
data from non-training data. In other words, membership
inference attacks are more likely to fail.
Advantage of an Adversary: We now introduce a new
metric to measure the advantage of an adversary who wants
to deploy a membership inference attack against a model.
With insufficient advantage, the accuracy of membership
inference is merely close to a random guess. Therefore, the
membership inference advantage of an adversary adv.mi
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Fig. 6. Prediction distribution comparison.
can be defined as:
advmi ==
|Pinference − Prandom|
Prandom
In particular, Pinference represents the accuracy of member-
ship inference for a specific adversary, while Prandom is the
probability of a random guess, which is 0.5, in that for a
specific sample, an adversary without any foreknowledge
may randomly output yes or no to guess whether the sam-
ple is from the training dataset. For example, when advmi
closes to zero, the membership inference attack merely a
random guess. We believe the metrics can better reflect the
capability when compared with the legacy ones, in that
it gives a result indicating whether the attack works in a
straightforward manner. Further, to demonstrate the feasi-
bility, we adopt the metric advmi to measure the advantages
in practice and illustrate the results in Table 2. As expected,
with DAMIA, the advantages of attackers are significantly
hindered. Please note that the training process, as well
as other related information of our testing models, have
been introduced before, and please refer to the previous
subsection for details.
TABLE 3
Performance comparison on MNSIT and SVHN (with AlexNet). Please
note that “Acc.” is referred to “Accuracy”, and “MIA” is referred to
membership inference attack. The same below.
Adapation
Direction (DAMIA)
Train Acc.
on Target
Test Acc.
on Target
MIA Acc.
on Target
advmi
on Target
MNIST→ SVHN 0.212566717 0.224953903 0.503727767 0.007455534
SVHN→MNIST 0.76805 0.7702 0.503108333 0.006216666
TABLE 4
Performance comparison on Office-31 (with AlexNet).
Adapation
Direction (DAMIA)
Train Acc.
on Target
Test Acc.
on Target
MIA Acc.
on Target
advmi
on Target
Amazon→ DSLR 0.447236181 0.46 0.528492462 0.056984924
Amazon→Webcam 0.501572327 0.459119497 0.534591195 0.06918239
DSLR→ Amazon 0.407900577 0.416666667 0.510169656 0.020339312
DSLR→Webcam 0.938679245 0.93081761 0.522012579 0.044025158
Webcam→ Amazon 0.375055482 0.372340426 0.514514926 0.029029852
Webcam→ DSLR 0.929648241 0.91 0.544296482 0.088592964
TABLE 2
Advantages comparison on Amazon and Webcam with/without DAMIA
enabled. Please note that “Acc.” is referred to “Accuracy”, and “MIA” is
referred to membership inference attack.
Sensitive data
Amazon Webcam
w/o DAMIA DAMIA w/o DAMIA DAMIA
MIA Acc. 0.77324 0.514514926 0.68003 0.534591195
adv.mi 0.54648 0.029029852 0.36006 0.06918239
4.3 Performance of different domain adaptation ap-
proaches
To Q2, we explore if the use of a different domain adap-
tation technique will affect the performance of DAMIA. To
this end, we train DAMIA with all the three approaches
introduced in Section 2 respectively, and evaluate the corre-
sponding performance of each model in terms of defending
against membership inference attack. As discussed before,
using advantage advmi is a simple but effective way to
evaluate if the membership inference attacks are possible.
Therefore, we will continue using this metric in the rest of
this section.
Discrepancy-based Domain Adaptation: We evaluate
the feasibility for DAMIA that is trained via discrepancy-
based domain adaptation approaches. Similar to the pre-
vious experiment, DDC (deep domain confusion [25] is
adopted. We then deploy membership inference attacks
against MNIST, SVHN and the three datasets in Office-31.
To eliminate the impact of the architecture of a DL model,
we use AlexNet and ResNet-50 [36] as the backbones of the
models respectively and have them trained for 150 epochs
to make sure that they are converged. The experiments are
shown in Table 3 to Table 6. It can be observed DAMIA
works against membership inference attacks effectively de-
spite the different architectures.
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Fig. 7. Intermediate representations of Webcam processed by the models without (left) or with (right) DAMIA enabled.
TABLE 5
Performance comparison on MNSIT and SVHN (with ResNet-50).
Adapation
Direction (DAMIA)
Train Acc.
on Target
Test Acc.
on Target
MIA Acc.
on Target
advmi
on Target
MNIST→ SVHN 0.219173594 0.227566073 0.511505038 0.023010076
SVHN→MNIST 0.778966667 0.7844 0.500133333 0.000266666
TABLE 6
Performance comparison on Office-31 (with ResNet-50).
Adapation
Direction (DAMIA)
Train Acc.
on Target
Test Acc.
on Target
MIA Acc.
on Target
advmi
on Target
Amazon→ DSLR 0.733668342 0.68 0.542964824 0.085929648
Amazon→Webcam 0.721698113 0.761006289 0.517295597 0.034591194
DSLR→ Amazon 0.625832224 0.675531915 0.507515983 0.015031966
DSLR→Webcam 0.962264151 0.981132075 0.504716981 0.009433962
Webcam→ Amazon 0.628051487 0.663120567 0.501553484 0.003106968
Webcam→ DSLR 0.992462312 0.99 0.551909548 0.103819096
Adversarial-based Domain Adaptation: We evaluate
the feasibility for DAMIA that is trained via adversarial-
based domain adaptation approaches. Similar to the first ex-
periment, we deploy membership inference attacks against
MNIST, SVHN and the three datasets in Office-31. AlexNet
and ResNet-50 [36] are severed as the backbones of the mod-
els respectively. The adversarial-based domain adaptation
approach used in the experiment is ADDA (i.e., Adversarial
Discriminative Domain Adaptation) [26]. It can be observed
that DAMIA works against membership inference attacks
effectively in Table 7. Unfortunately, the performances are
not as good as we expected. For example, when Amazon is
adopted to obfuscate Webcam, the test accuracy of Webcam
is down to 1.2579%. Likewise, when DSLR is adopted to
obfuscate Webcam, the test accuracy is only 6.918239%,
even when ResNet-50 is used as the backbone. ResNet-
50 has more layers when compared with AlexNet, and
TABLE 7
Performance comparison on MNSIT and SVHN (with ADDA).
Adapation
Direction (DAMIA)
Train Acc.
on Target
Test Acc.
on Target
MIA Acc.
on Target
advmi
on Target
MNIST→ SVHN 0.137803 0.139943 0.5148440 0.029688
SVHN→MNIST 0.735633 0.7426 0.5007183 0.0014366
theoretically, it should have a better capacity in learning
representations [37]. This may be attributed to the fact that
when GAN is adopted, the model is often difficult to reach
convergence [38], placing barriers for the model to learn the
shared representation. We also find that the procedures of
training DAMIA via adversarial-based domain adaptation
approaches are sophisticated, in that there are four models
are involved. Given its unsatisfactory performance, we ar-
gue that it is not recommended to train DAMIA via that
type of approach.
Reconstruction-based Domain Adaptation: We further
evaluate the feasibility of DAMIA that is trained via
reconstruction-based domain adaptation approaches. We
deploy membership inference attacks against MNIST, SVHN
and the three datasets in Office-31. We choose DRCN
(i.e., Deep Reconstruction Classification Networks) [29] to
conduct our experiments. For MNIST and SVHN, we select
a vallina CNN with three convolution layers and two fully
connected layers as the backbone of the model. Again, we
use AlexNet as the backbone for Office-31. Experiment
results are shown in Table 8 and Table 9. Similarly, the
advantage for an attacker is approaching zero, indicating
that DAMIA work against membership inference attacks
effectively.
4.4 Factors that Affects the Usability
In the previous section, our experiment shows that DAMIA
work against membership inference attacks effectively de-
spite the approaches. However, some of the approaches
9TABLE 8
Performance comparison on MNSIT and SVHN (with DRCN).
Adapation
Direction (DAMIA)
Train Acc.
on Target
Test Acc.
on Target
MIA Acc.
on Target
advmi
on Target
MNIST→ SVHN 0.162838 0.191726 0.525682 0.051364
SVHN→MNIST 0.682617 0.696000 0.500008 0.000016
TABLE 9
Performance comparison on Office-31 (with DRCN).
Adapation
Direction (DAMIA)
Train Acc.
on Target
Test Acc.
on Target
MIA Acc.
on Target
advmi
on Target
Amazon→ DSLR 0.412060302 0.55 0.568492462 0.136984924
Amazon→Webcam 0.375786164 0.459119497 0.550314465 0.10062893
DSLR→ Amazon 0.220594763 0.242907801 0.526324239 0.052648478
DSLR→Webcam 0.798742138 0.836477987 0.58490566 0.16981132
Webcam→ Amazon 0.253883711 0.290780142 0.517025762 0.034051524
Webcam→ DSLR 0.891959799 0.9 0.600452261 0.200904522
may not have a good test accuracy, which hurts the us-
ability of the original dataset. Therefore, in this section, we
want to explore the factors that may affect the usability
of DAMIA, which is the answer to Q3. Recall that we are
using datasets in the source domain to obfuscate dataset in
the target domain, and therefore, we can only manipulate
dataset in the source domain. Further, we select a few
factors including size, diversity and similarity that may have
impacts on the usability, and adjust the dataset using those
factors accordingly to see what the impacts are. Assume
that source domain consists of n datasets which are denoted
as Dsource = (d1, d2, ...di, ..., dn), where di is referred to
each dataset of the source domain. Particularly, we list those
factors below:
• Size. We define the size of the source domainDsource
as follows:
size(Dsource) =
n∑
i=1
|di|
• Diversity. The diversity is defined as the amount of
datasets involved in the source domain, which can
be denoted as:
diversity(Dsource) = |Dsource|
• Similarity. To measure the similarity between do-
mains, we first calculate the norm of a domain ‖Di‖
by calculating the average of all the samples in
Di, which can be regarded as a representative of
the domain. Since we focus on image datasets, the
representatives are essentially images. The similarity
between domains is further defined as the similarity
between the representatives of each domain. To this
end, we use perceptual hashing [39] to generate the
fingerprints (a hash value) for each representative,
denoted as phash(‖Di‖). By perceptual hashing, if
two images are perceptually identical, the difference
between their fingerprints is modest [39]. Therefore,
the similarity between domains is reflected by the
TABLE 10
Different sizes of dataset v.s. accuracy
Size of
Source Domain
Train Acc.
on Target
Test Acc.
on Target
MIA Acc.
on Target
advmi
on Target
31 0.316037736 0.270440252 0.537735849 0.075471698
93 0.555031447 0.622641509 0.516509434 0.033018868
186 0.610062893 0.616352201 0.533805031 0.067610062
310 0.682389937 0.685534591 0.52908805 0.0581761
465 0.694968553 0.660377358 0.528301887 0.056603774
620 0.699685535 0.716981132 0.511006289 0.022012578
930 0.724842767 0.72327044 0.525157233 0.050314466
1302 0.746855346 0.710691824 0.521226415 0.04245283
1736 0.740566038 0.748427673 0.517295597 0.034591194
2108 0.732704403 0.742138365 0.519654088 0.039308176
difference between the fingerprints of their repre-
sentatives. Formally, the similarity can be defined as
follows:
similarity = 1− phash(‖Dsource‖)− phash(‖Dtarget‖)
len(phash(‖Dsource‖))
In the following experiments, we select Office-31
as the experiment dataset and discrepancy-based domain
adaptions for DAMIA. Also, AlexNet is adopted as the
backbone of the model.
Size: In our experiment, we use Amazon to obfuscate
Webcam. Particularly, we want to explore how does the size
of the dataset in the source domain (i.e., Amazon) affects the
usability of the generated model. To this end, we gradually
increase the size of each category in Amazon from 1 to
68. Recall that Amazon includes 31 categories in total, and
therefore, the size of the source domain ranges from 31 to
2108. For each dataset with the specific size, we train the
model for 100 epochs to minimize the impacts of errors.
We then test the accuracy of the trained model. Provided
that the obfuscated model can achieve a high accuracy, the
usability of the model is not hindered. Moreover, changing
the size of the dataset should not impair the effectiveness.
Therefore, we also deploy the membership inference attacks
against the trained model. Figure 8 shows the result. It
can be observed that an increased size of a dataset in the
source domain has negative impacts on the advantages of
membership inference attacks slightly. This is reasonable
since a larger dataset provides more samples for the model
to perform the obfuscation. However, it can also be observed
that even a dataset with a small size such as the one that
has only 31 samples, also has excellent effectiveness. On the
other hand, it can also be observed that a dataset with more
samples has positive impacts on the usability.
Diversity: We want to explore how does the diversity
of the dataset in the source domain affects the usability of
the model trained by DAMIA. Therefore, we modify the
diversity of datasets in the source domain, and observe if
the usability changes. Recall that there are three domains
in Office-31 including Amazon, DSLR and Webcam. We
modify the diversity the datasets by “mixing” two of them
together. For example, Mix(Amazon ⊕ DSLR) is referred
to a new dataset that contains all the samples from the
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Fig. 8. Test accuracy v.s. membership inference accuracy under different
sizes of the dataset in source domain.
dataset Amazon and all samples from the dataset DSLR.
Next, we use the mixed dataset to obfuscate the remaining
one that is not involved in the mixing process. Similarly, all
the models involved are trained for 100 epochs to minimize
errors. We test the usability afterwards and deploy mem-
bership inference attacks against those models. Results of
diversity of 2 are illustrated in Table 11, and we compare
the test accuracy under different diversities (i.e., diversity
equals 1 4 and diversity equals 2 5) in Table 12 for better
illustration. From the comparison, we see the diversity
has a limited contribution to the usability. When diversity
increases, the test accuracy does not always proportion-
ally ascend. For example, the test accuracy of the model
using DSLR to obfuscate Webcam is higher than the one
using Mix(Amazon ⊕ DSLR) for obfuscation. Likewise,
as shown in Table 13, the comparison of the advantages
of membership inference attacks with different diversities
indicates that a larger diversity impairs the effectiveness of
DAMIA. Therefore, DAMIA does not have advantages to be
adopted to a dataset with a large diversity.
TABLE 11
Test accuracy on mixed source domains
Adaptation
Direction
Train Acc.
on Target
Test Acc.
on Target
MIA Acc.
on Target
advmi
on Target
Mix(DSLR ⊕ Webcam)→ Amazon 0.634265424 0.640070922 0.501714027 0.003428054
Mix(Amazon ⊕ Webcam)→ DSLR 0.854271357 0.83 0.549346734 0.098693468
Mix(Amazon ⊕ DSLR)→Webcam 0.8525 0.8 0.56625 0.1325
Similarity: We then explore that how does the similarity
between the source and target domains affect the usability
of DAMIA. To this end, we create multiple similar datasets
to obfuscate Webcam. Instead of collecting similar samples,
we generate similar samples by modifying original sam-
ples from Webcam slightly. For example, the modification
4. For source domains consisting of 1 dataset, their diversity is:
diversity(Dsource) = |Dsource| = |(d1)| = 1, such a source domain
may be Dsource = (dAmazon).
5. For source domains consisting of 2 datasets, their diversity is:
diversity(Dsource) = |Dsource| = |(d1, d2)| = 2, such a source
domain may be Dsource = |(dAmazon, dDSLR)|.
can be realized through the adjustment of the luminance
(brightness) and tools for that goal [40] are available on-
line 6. Particularly, brightness, contrast, Gaussian noise and
motion blur are involved in our experiment to modify the
original image as shown in Figure 9. Similar to the previous
experiments, all the models are trained for 100 epochs,
and membership inference attacks are deployed on those
models. Table 14 shows that the test accuracies of models
are specifically enhanced with an excellent effectiveness
achieved.
TABLE 14
Similarity v.s. Test accuracy. The Original stands for the Webcam
from Office-31. Please note that in this case, the similarity between
the similar source and the target is above 0.8, while in the case where
the sources are Amazon and DSLR, the similarities are 0.593750 and
0.781250.
Adaptation
Direction
Similarity
Train Acc.
on Target
Test Acc.
on Target
MIA Acc.
on Target
advmi
on Target
Brightness→ Original 0.843750 0.993710692 1.0 0.510220126 0.020440252
Contrast→ Original 0.843750 0.993710692 0.993710692 0.512578616 0.025157232
Gaussian Noise→ Original 0.812500 0.988993711 0.974842767 0.522012579 0.044025158
Motion Blur→ Original 0.812500 0.995283019 0.993710692 0.512578616 0.025157232
5 RELATED WORKS
Defenses against Membership Inference Attacks: Defenses
against membership inference can be categorized into three
groups: (i) regularization-based defenses; (ii) differential-
privacy-based defenses; (iii) adversarial-attack-based de-
fenses. Regularization-based defenses directly adopt regu-
larization techniques to build defenses. Shokri et al. [8] and
Salem et al. [15] show that potential techniques including L2
regularization [41] and Dropout [42] may prevent overfitting
issues so as to counter the membership inference attacks.
However, our defense is stemmed from the DA techniques,
which are not designed to address the overfitting issues.
Salem et al. [15] use another regularization technique called
ensemble learning to build their defense. Their defense re-
quires extra storage to maintain ML (i.e. Machine Learning)
models. Our defense does not have such a requirement.
Nasr et al. [33] introduce a new regularization term and pro-
pose an adversarial training process termed min-max game
to optimized the regularization terms so as to defend against
the membership inference attacks. However, their defense
is time-consuming since the adversarial training process
is involved. Adversarial-attack-based defenses shield vic-
tim models by adversarial attacks. Jia et al. [17] propose
MemGuard, where adversarial examples [16] are introduced
to obfuscate samples and confuse the attackers. However,
MemGuard is subject to sophisticated operations to turn
the outputs of victim models into adversarial examples.
When compared with MemGuard, our defense can achieve
the same goal while requiring fewer efforts. Differential-
privacy based defenses have draw defenders’ attention
[11, 18, 43, 44], where the goal is achieved via adding noises
to the loss function or gradients of the model. However, the
method also degrades the usability of the model and slows
the training process. DAMIA does not add noises to the loss
function, and the efficiency is not hindered while training
when compared with their scheme.
6. https://github.com/hendrycks/robustness
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TABLE 12
Diversity of dataset in source domain v.s. accuracy. Please note that the diversity of “Mix” is set to 2.
Sensitive Dataset Dataset for Obfuscation
Amazon DSLR Webcam Mix(Amazon ⊕ DSLR) Mix(Amazon ⊕Webcam) Mix(DSLR ⊕Webcam)
Amazon - 0.407900577 0.375055482 - - 0.64007092
DSLR 0.46 - 0.929648241 - 0.83 -
Webcam 0.459119497 0.938679245 - 0.80 - -
TABLE 13
Diversity vs advantages. Please note that the diversity of “Mix” is set to 2.
Sensitive Dataset Dataset for Obfuscation
Amazon DSLR Webcam Mix(Amazon ⊕ DSLR) Mix(Amazon ⊕Webcam) Mix(DSLR ⊕Webcam)
Amazon - 0.015031966 0.003106968 - - 0.003428054
DSLR 0.085929648 - 0.103819096 - 0.098693468 -
Webcam 0.034591194 0.009433962 - 0.1325 - -
Original Brightness Contrast Gaussian Noise Motion Blur
Fig. 9. Images of a desk lamp from Webcam and its perturbed versions.
Transfer Learning in Privacy-Preserving Machine
Learning. Papernot et al. [45] apply transfer learning to
avoid model information leakage. Triastcyn and Faltings
[43] adopt GAN [46] to address a similar issue as the
work [45]. Particularly, in [43], the authors generate the
artificial training dataset based on a private dataset and
use the generated dataset to train a model. However, those
efforts do not have a focus, stating what type of attack their
defense may counter. Our DAMIA focuses on countering
membership inference attacks. Shokri et al. [8], Song et al.
[32] shows that the temperature scaling technique, which is
widely adopted in the area of domain adaptation, has the
potential to defend membership inference attacks. In our
defense, we use the other domain adaptation techniques
rather than the temperature scaling technique to defend
against the attacks.
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose DAMIA, which leverages domain
adaptation as a defense to prevent membership inference
attacks. DAMIA effectively counters the membership infer-
ence attacks while the usability is not hindered. Also, we
show that with proper factors enabled, the performance
of the model can be boosted. The next stage of our work
is to explore a mechanism that can automatically select or
generate a related dataset of the given sensitive dataset so
as to free the manual load.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Weiqi Luo was partially supported by National Natu-
ral Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 61877029),
Guangdong Provincial Special Funds for Applied Tech-
nology Research and Development and Transformation
of Important Scientific and Technological Achieve (Grant
Nos.2017B010124002). Jian Weng was partially supported
by National Key R&D Plan of China (Grant Nos.
2017YFB0802203, 2018YFB1003701), National Natural Sci-
ence Foundation of China (Grant Nos. 61825203, U1736203,
61732021), Guangdong Provincial Special Funds for Applied
Technology Research and Development and Transformation
of Important Scientific and Technological Achieve (Grant
Nos. 2016B010124009 and 2017B010124002). Guoqiang Zeng
was partially supported by National Natural Science Foun-
dation of China (Grant Nos. 11871248, U1636209). Yue
Zhang was partially supported by National Natural Sci-
ence Foundation of China (Grant Nos. 61877029). Hongwei
Huang was partially supported by National Natural Science
Foundation of China (Grant Nos. 61872153). Anjia Yang was
partially supported by National Natural Science Foundation
of China (Grant Nos. 61702222).
REFERENCES
[1] A. v. d. Oord, S. Dieleman, H. Zen, K. Simonyan,
O. Vinyals, A. Graves, N. Kalchbrenner, A. Senior, and
12
K. Kavukcuoglu, “Wavenet: A generative model for
raw audio,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1609.03499, 2016.
[2] V. Mnih, K. Kavukcuoglu, D. Silver, A. A. Rusu, J. Ve-
ness, M. G. Bellemare, A. Graves, M. Riedmiller, A. K.
Fidjeland, G. Ostrovski et al., “Human-level control
through deep reinforcement learning,” Nature, vol. 518,
no. 7540, p. 529, 2015.
[3] O. M. Parkhi, A. Vedaldi, A. Zisserman et al., “Deep
face recognition.” in bmvc, vol. 1, no. 3, 2015, p. 6.
[4] W. Li, R. Zhao, T. Xiao, and X. Wang, “Deepreid:
Deep filter pairing neural network for person re-
identification,” in Proceedings of the IEEE conference on
computer vision and pattern recognition, 2014, pp. 152–
159.
[5] S. P. Mohanty, D. P. Hughes, and M. Salathe´, “Using
deep learning for image-based plant disease detection,”
Frontiers in plant science, vol. 7, p. 1419, 2016.
[6] Technavio, “Deep learning market by type and geogra-
phy - forecast and analysis 2020-2024,” 2020.
[7] M. Fredrikson, S. Jha, and T. Ristenpart, “Model in-
version attacks that exploit confidence information and
basic countermeasures,” in Proceedings of the 22nd ACM
SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications
Security. ACM, 2015, pp. 1322–1333.
[8] R. Shokri, M. Stronati, C. Song, and V. Shmatikov,
“Membership inference attacks against machine learn-
ing models,” in 2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and
Privacy (SP). IEEE, 2017, pp. 3–18.
[9] K. Ganju, Q. Wang, W. Yang, C. A. Gunter, and
N. Borisov, “Property inference attacks on fully con-
nected neural networks using permutation invari-
ant representations,” in Proceedings of the 2018 ACM
SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications
Security. ACM, 2018, pp. 619–633.
[10] A. Salem, A. Bhattacharya, M. Backes, M. Fritz, and
Y. Zhang, “Updates-leak: Data set inference and re-
construction attacks in online learning,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1904.01067, 2019.
[11] A. Pyrgelis, C. Troncoso, and E. De Cristofaro, “Knock
knock, who’s there? membership inference on aggre-
gate location data,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1708.06145,
2017.
[12] D. Chen, N. Yu, Y. Zhang, and M. Fritz, “Gan-leaks:
A taxonomy of membership inference attacks against
gans,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1909.03935, 2019.
[13] G. Liu, C. Wang, K. Peng, H. Huang, Y. Li, and
W. Cheng, “Socinf: Membership inference attacks on
social media health data with machine learning,” IEEE
Transactions on Computational Social Systems, vol. 6,
no. 5, pp. 907–921, 2019.
[14] P. Voigt and A. Von dem Bussche, “The eu general data
protection regulation (gdpr),” A Practical Guide, 1st Ed.,
Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017.
[15] A. Salem, Y. Zhang, M. Humbert, P. Berrang, M. Fritz,
and M. Backes, “Ml-leaks: Model and data independent
membership inference attacks and defenses on machine
learning models,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1806.01246, 2018.
[16] I. J. Goodfellow, J. Shlens, and C. Szegedy, “Explaining
and harnessing adversarial examples,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1412.6572, 2014.
[17] J. Jia, A. Salem, M. Backes, Y. Zhang, and N. Z. Gong,
“Memguard: Defending against black-box membership
inference attacks via adversarial examples,” in Proceed-
ings of the 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer
and Communications Security, 2019, pp. 259–274.
[18] B. Jayaraman and D. Evans, “Evaluating differen-
tially private machine learning in practice,” in 28th
{USENIX} Security Symposium ({USENIX} Security 19),
2019, pp. 1895–1912.
[19] M. Nasr, R. Shokri, and A. Houmansadr, “Compre-
hensive privacy analysis of deep learning: Stand-alone
and federated learning under passive and active white-
box inference attacks,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1812.00910,
2018.
[20] R. Shokri, M. Strobel, and Y. Zick, “Privacy risks of
explaining machine learning models,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1907.00164, 2019.
[21] S. Yeom, I. Giacomelli, M. Fredrikson, and S. Jha, “Pri-
vacy risk in machine learning: Analyzing the connec-
tion to overfitting,” in 2018 IEEE 31st Computer Security
Foundations Symposium (CSF). IEEE, 2018, pp. 268–282.
[22] Z. Yang, J. Zhang, E.-C. Chang, and Z. Liang, “Neu-
ral network inversion in adversarial setting via back-
ground knowledge alignment,” in Proceedings of the
2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Com-
munications Security, 2019, pp. 225–240.
[23] S. J. Pan and Q. Yang, “A survey on transfer learning,”
IEEE Transactions on knowledge and data engineering,
vol. 22, no. 10, pp. 1345–1359, 2009.
[24] M. Wang and W. Deng, “Deep visual domain adapta-
tion: A survey,” Neurocomputing, vol. 312, pp. 135–153,
2018.
[25] E. Tzeng, J. Hoffman, N. Zhang, K. Saenko, and T. Dar-
rell, “Deep domain confusion: Maximizing for domain
invariance,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1412.3474, 2014.
[26] E. Tzeng, J. Hoffman, K. Saenko, and T. Darrell, “Ad-
versarial discriminative domain adaptation,” in Pro-
ceedings of the IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and
Pattern Recognition, 2017, pp. 7167–7176.
[27] H. Ajakan, P. Germain, H. Larochelle, F. Laviolette, and
M. Marchand, “Domain-adversarial neural networks,”
arXiv preprint arXiv:1412.4446, 2014.
[28] Y. Ganin, E. Ustinova, H. Ajakan, P. Germain,
H. Larochelle, F. Laviolette, M. Marchand, and V. Lem-
pitsky, “Domain-adversarial training of neural net-
works,” in Domain Adaptation in Computer Vision Ap-
plications. Springer, 2017, pp. 189–209.
[29] M. Ghifary, W. B. Kleijn, M. Zhang, D. Balduzzi, and
W. Li, “Deep reconstruction-classification networks for
unsupervised domain adaptation,” in European Confer-
ence on Computer Vision. Springer, 2016, pp. 597–613.
[30] P. Vincent, H. Larochelle, I. Lajoie, Y. Bengio, and P.-A.
Manzagol, “Stacked denoising autoencoders: Learning
useful representations in a deep network with a local
denoising criterion,” Journal of machine learning research,
vol. 11, no. Dec, pp. 3371–3408, 2010.
[31] A. Krizhevsky, I. Sutskever, and G. E. Hinton, “Im-
agenet classification with deep convolutional neural
networks,” in Advances in neural information processing
systems, 2012, pp. 1097–1105.
[32] L. Song, R. Shokri, and P. Mittal, “Privacy risks of
securing machine learning models against adversarial
13
examples,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1905.10291, 2019.
[33] M. Nasr, R. Shokri, and A. Houmansadr, “Machine
learning with membership privacy using adversarial
regularization,” in Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC
Conference on Computer and Communications Security,
2018, pp. 634–646.
[34] Y. LeCun, Y. Bengio, and G. Hinton, “Deep learning,”
nature, vol. 521, no. 7553, pp. 436–444, 2015.
[35] L. v. d. Maaten and G. Hinton, “Visualizing data using
t-sne,” Journal of machine learning research, vol. 9, no.
Nov, pp. 2579–2605, 2008.
[36] K. He, X. Zhang, S. Ren, and J. Sun, “Deep residual
learning for image recognition,” in Proceedings of the
IEEE conference on computer vision and pattern recognition,
2016, pp. 770–778.
[37] B. Sun and K. Saenko, “Deep coral: Correlation align-
ment for deep domain adaptation,” in European Confer-
ence on Computer Vision. Springer, 2016, pp. 443–450.
[38] S. A. Barnett, “Convergence problems with gen-
erative adversarial networks (gans),” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1806.11382, 2018.
[39] C. Zauner, “Implementation and benchmarking of per-
ceptual image hash functions,” 2010.
[40] D. Hendrycks and T. Dietterich, “Benchmarking neural
network robustness to common corruptions and per-
turbations,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1903.12261, 2019.
[41] A. Y. Ng, “Feature selection, l 1 vs. l 2 regularization,
and rotational invariance,” in Proceedings of the twenty-
first international conference on Machine learning, 2004,
p. 78.
[42] N. Srivastava, G. Hinton, A. Krizhevsky, I. Sutskever,
and R. Salakhutdinov, “Dropout: a simple way to pre-
vent neural networks from overfitting,” The journal of
machine learning research, vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 1929–1958,
2014.
[43] A. Triastcyn and B. Faltings, “Generating artifi-
cial data for private deep learning,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1803.03148, 2018.
[44] C. Xu, J. Ren, D. Zhang, Y. Zhang, Z. Qin, and K. Ren,
“Ganobfuscator: Mitigating information leakage under
gan via differential privacy,” IEEE Transactions on Infor-
mation Forensics and Security, vol. 14, no. 9, pp. 2358–
2371, 2019.
[45] N. Papernot, M. Abadi, U. Erlingsson, I. Goodfellow,
and K. Talwar, “Semi-supervised knowledge transfer
for deep learning from private training data,” arXiv
preprint arXiv:1610.05755, 2016.
[46] I. Goodfellow, J. Pouget-Abadie, M. Mirza, B. Xu,
D. Warde-Farley, S. Ozair, A. Courville, and Y. Bengio,
“Generative adversarial nets,” in Advances in neural
information processing systems, 2014, pp. 2672–2680.
Hongwei Huang received his B.S. degree in
software engineering from South China Agricul-
ture University (2014 - 2018). He has been pur-
suing his M.S. degree in Jinan University since
2018. His research interests include machine
learning and its privacy and security.
Weiqi Luo received his B.S. degree from Jinan
University in 1982 and Ph.D. degree from South
China University of Technology in 2000. Cur-
rently, he is a professor with School of Informa-
tion Science and Technology in Jinan University,
Guangzhou. His research interests include net-
work security, big data, artificial intelligence, etc.
He has published more than 100 high-quality pa-
pers in international journals and conferences.
Guoqiang Zeng received Ph.D. degree in Con-
trol Science and Engineering from Zhejiang Uni-
versity, China, in 2011. He is currently a pro-
fessor in College of Cyber Security, Jinan Uni-
versity, Guangzhou, and is also with National-
Local Joint Engineering Laboratory of Digital-
ize Electrical Design Technology, Wenzhou Uni-
versity, Wenzhou, China. His research interests
include modeling, control and optimization of
smart grid, Internet of Things, computational in-
telligence and cyber security. He has authored or
co-authored the book Extremal optimization: Fundamentals, algorithms,
and applications published by CRC press, and more than 50 journal and
conference articles. He holds over ten patents. Dr. Zeng was a recipient
of eight ministerial and provincial science and technology progress
awards.
Jian Weng is a professor and the Executive
Dean with College of Information Science and
Technology in Jinan University. He received B.S.
degree and M.S. degree at South China Univer-
sity of Technology in 2001 and 2004 respectively,
and Ph.D. degree at Shanghai Jiao Tong Univer-
sity in 2008. His research areas include public
key cryptography, cloud security, blockchain, etc.
He has published 80 papers in international con-
ferences and journals such as CRYPTO, EURO-
CRYPT, ASIACRYPT, TCC, PKC, CT-RSA, IEEE
TDSC, etc. He also serves as associate editor of IEEE Transactions on
Vehicular Technology.
14
Yue Zhang is a PhD student in the College of
Information Science and Technology & College
of Cyber Security at Jinan University. Also, he
studied and worked at the University of Cen-
tral Florida (UCF) / University of Massachusetts
Lowell (UML). His research focuses on system
security, especially IoT security. He won Out-
standing Research Paper Award of GuangDong
Computer Federation in 2019, Best Paper Award
of IEEE International Conference on Industrial
Internet in 2019, National scholarship for Ph.D
Students in Cyber Security (China), Outstanding Graduates in 2016,
National scholarship for Master Students in 2015. He has been pub-
lishing papers in conferences such as IEEE International Conference
on Computer Communications (INFOCOM), International Symposium
on Research in Attacks, Intrusions and Defenses (RAID) journals such
as IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing (TDSC),
IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems (TPDS). His
research work was also selected by Black Hat Aisa.
Anjia Yang (M’17) received the B.S. degree
from Jilin University in 2011 and the Ph.D. de-
gree from the City University of Hong Kong in
2015. From December 2015 to September 2019,
he held postdoc positions in City University of
Hong Kong and Jinan University, respectively,
during when he visited University of Waterloo in
Canada. He is currently an associate professor
in Jinan University, Guangzhou. His research
interests include security and privacy in vehic-
ular networks, internet of things, blockchain and
cloud computing, and he has published more than 20 papers.
